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Unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment based on the uncertainty principle
Guang Ping He∗
School of Physics, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou 510275, China
Unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment (QBC) was considered impossible. But the no-
go proofs are based on the Hughston-Jozsa-Wootters (HJW) theorem (a.k.a. the Uhlmann theorem).
Recently it was found that in high-dimensional systems, there exist some states which can display
a chaos effect in quantum steering, so that the attack strategy based on the HJW theorem has to
require the capability of discriminating quantum states with very subtle difference, to the extent
that is not allowed by the uncertainty principle. With the help of this finding, here we propose a
simple QBC protocol which manages to evade the no-go proofs.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk, 03.65.Ta, 03.67.Ac, 89.70.-a
I. INTRODUCTION
Besides the well-known quantum key distribution [1],
bit commitment (BC) is another essential cryptographic
primitive. It is a two-party cryptography including two
phases. In the commit phase, Alice decides the value
of the bit b (b = 0 or 1) that she wants to commit, and
sends Bob a piece of evidence, e.g., some quantum states.
Later, in the unveil phase, Alice announces the value of b,
and Bob checks it with the evidence. An unconditionally
secure BC protocol needs to be both binding (i.e., Alice
cannot change the value of b after the commit phase) and
concealing (Bob cannot know b before the unveil phase).
BC is closely related with many other cryptographic
tasks, e.g., coin tossing [1] and oblivious transfer [2, 3],
all of which are the building blocks for even more compli-
cated multi-party secure computation protocols [4]. Un-
fortunately, it is widely accepted that unconditionally se-
cure quantum BC (QBC) is impossible [5–35] , despite of
some attempts towards secure ones (a detailed list and
brief history can be found in the introduction of [36]).
This result, known as the Mayers-Lo-Chau (MLC) no-go
theorem, was considered as putting a serious drawback
on quantum cryptography.
But all these no-go proofs are based on the Hughston-
Jozsa-Wootters (HJW) theorem [37], which also ap-
peared under different names (e.g., the Uhlmann theo-
rem) and presentations in literature [38–44]. As concisely
summarized in [8], the conclusion of the HJW theorem
can be expressed as follows.
The HJW theorem:
Let ψ01, ψ
0
2, ..., ψ
0
m and ψ
1
1, ψ
1
2, ..., ψ
1
m′ be two sets
of possible quantum states with associated probabilities
described by an identical density matrix ρ. It is possible
to construct a composite system α⊗ β such that β alone
has density matrix ρ and such that there exists a pair of
measurements M0, M1 with the property that applying
M0 (M1) to α yields an index i of state ψ
0
i (ψ
1
i ) to
which β will have collapsed.
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However, it is worth noting that there is one thing left
unanswered in the HJW theorem: will the two measure-
ments M0 and M1 also be sufficiently distinguishable?
Very recently, it was found [45] that if we take {ψ0i } and
{ψ1i } as the two sets of evenly distributed states{
ψ0i ≡ |φi+〉 =
1√
2
(|0〉+ |i〉), i = 1, ..., n− 1
}
(1)
and{
ψ1i ≡ |φi−〉 =
1√
2
(|0〉 − |i〉), i = 1, ..., n− 1
}
, (2)
where all |i〉 together with |0〉 form an orthonormal basis
of the corresponding n-dimensional system β, then an
interesting result occurs. That is, the two corresponding
measurements M0 and M1 can become arbitrarily close
to each other when n increases.
As we know, the precision of any measurement de-
vice is restricted by the quantum uncertainty principle.
Consequently, when two measurements are getting ex-
tremely close, they will eventually become indistinguish-
able. Basing on these observations, in this paper we will
build a QBC protocol which can evade the no-go proofs.
In the next section, we will elaborate the conjunction
between the HJW theorem and the no-go proofs (i.e., the
original MLC theorem and its expansions) of uncondi-
tionally secure QBC. Then in section III, we will review
briefly the anomalous result found in [45]. Our QBC
protocol will be presented in section IV, with its security
against Alice and Bob being proven in sections V and
VI, respectively. Section VII gives a technical remark
on the mathematical method used in the security proof.
The significance of the result, especially its impact on
the possible development of fundamental theories, will
be addressed in section VIII.
II. NO-GO PROOFS AND THE HJW THEOREM
Let us first review briefly the general features of the
no-go proofs of QBC [5–35].
(I) The reduced model. Following the presentation of
[7], in these proofs any QBC protocol can be rephrased
as the following general procedure.
2(1) Alice prepares the state
|Ωb〉 =
∑
i
λbi
∣∣ζbi 〉α ⊗ ∣∣ψbi 〉β . (3)
according to the value of b that she wants to commit to
Bob. Here, for each specific value of b,
∣∣ζbi 〉α’s are a set
of orthogonal states of system α, while
∣∣ψbi 〉β ’s are not
necessarily orthogonal to each other.
(2) An honest Alice is now supposed to make a
measurement on α and determine the value of i.
(3) Alice sends system β to Bob as the evidence
for her commitment. This completes the commit phase.
(4) In the unveil phase, Alice opens the commit-
ment by declaring the values of b and i, i.e., she reveals
which
∣∣ψbi 〉β was sent to Bob.
(5) Bob measures system β to verify Alice’s de-
clared data.
(II) The concealing condition. To ensure that Bob’s
information on the committed bit is trivial before the un-
veil phase, any QBC protocol secure against Bob should
satisfy
ρβ
0
≃ ρβ
1
, (4)
where ρβb ≡ Trα |Ωb〉 〈Ωb| is the reduced density matrix of
the state sent to Bob corresponding to Alice’s committed
bit b.
(III) The cheating strategy. Here is where the HJW
theorem comes to serve. A dishonest Alice can begin the
QBC protocol described by the reduced model by prepar-
ing system α⊗β in such a state that β alone has density
matrix ρβ0 . Then she skips the measurement in step (2)
so that α and β remain entangled throughout the commit
phase. In the unveil phase, since Eq. (4) is satisfied, the
HJW theorem ensures that she can unveil the state of β
as either
∣∣ψ0i 〉β or ∣∣ψ1i 〉β at her will, simply by choosing
between the two measurementsM0,M1 mentioned in the
HJW theorem (as summarized in Introduction) on α.
In other words (as in the presentation in [7]), Alice
can start the protocol with |Ω0〉 as described in Eq. (3)
and skips step (2). Later if she wants to unveil b = 0, she
simply measures α in the basis {
∣∣ζ0i 〉α} (equivalent to ap-
plying measurement M0) in step (4). Or if she wants to
unveil b = 1, all she needs is to apply a unitary transfor-
mation U to rotate her measurement basis from {
∣∣ζ0i 〉α}
to {
∣∣ζ1i 〉α}, or equivalently, apply the transformation U †
on α which maps |Ω0〉 into |Ω1〉, then still measure it in
the basis {
∣∣ζ0i 〉α} (both are equivalent to applying mea-
surement M1).
Consequently, Alice needs not to determine the value
of b until the unveil phase. That is, a concealing QBC
protocol cannot be binding, so that unconditionally se-
cure QBC deems impossible.
Note that the HJW theorem applies only to the case
where ρβ0 = ρ
β
1 is satisfied rigorously. But the no-go
proofs also apply to protocols that are ε-concealing, i.e.,
satisfying ρβ0 ≃ ρβ1 instead of ρβ0 = ρβ1 . The detailed
cheating strategy is: Alice commits to one of the density
matrix (e.g., ρβ0 ) first. Then if she wants to alter the
commitment to b = 1, she turns ρβ
0
into another density
matrix ρ′β1 using the method described in HJW theorem,
where ρ′β1 = ρ
β
0 , and the states corresponding to ρ
′β
1 are
very close to those corresponding to ρβ
1
. Since ρ′β
1
≃
ρβ1 , Bob can hardly distinguish them apart, so that the
cheating can be successful with a probability ε-close to
1. That is, the cheating on ε-concealing protocols still
relies on the HJW theorem. Dishonest Alice still needs
to find two different measurements M0 and M1 on α to
steer Bob’s system β from ρβ0 to ρ
′β
1 .
After the early appearance of the MLC no-go theo-
rem [5–7], there were many newer no-go proofs [8–35]
which enriched the above reduced model in different as-
pects so that they can be more general and rigorous. But
the HJW theorem is always the base of the final step of
their cheating strategies, though sometimes not explicitly
cited.
In literature, there were attempts on building QBC
which challenge either the above feature (I) or (II) (see
[36, 46–48] and the references therein). But we will
present a QBC protocol which satisfies the features (I)
and (II), while the cheating strategy (III) does not work.
This is based on a recent discovery on quantum steering,
as reviewed below.
III. CHAOS IN STEERING IN
HIGH-DIMENSIONAL SYSTEMS
Very recently, it was found that in high-dimensional
systems, there exists a specific form of bipartite quan-
tum system which can display a kind of chaos effect when
being adopted for steering [45]. That is, a subtle differ-
ence in the measurement results on one side can steer the
other side into completely orthogonal states.
More specifically, let us take ψ0i ’s and ψ
1
i ’s mentioned
in the above description of the HJW theorem as the two
sets of evenly distributed states {φi+} and {φi−} in Eqs.
(1) and (2), and denote their density matrics as ρ+ and
ρ−, respectively. It was proven in [45] that the trace
distance between ρ+ and ρ− is
D(ρ+, ρ−) ≡ 1
2
tr
√
(ρ+ − ρ−)†(ρ+ − ρ−) = 1√
n− 1 .
(5)
Therefore, ρ+ and ρ− can be arbitrarily close to each
other with the increase of n. But for any finite n,
ρ+ = ρ− cannot be satisfied rigorously so that the HJW
theorem cannot be applied directly. Thus, Alice cannot
expect to find a bipartite system α⊗β such that her local
measurements on α alone can steer the state of β from
an element of {|φi+〉} to an element of {|φi−〉} with a
probability equals exactly to 1. Now let us study what
happens if Alice tries to steer the state of β to another
state which is very close to an element of {|φi−〉}, as de-
3scribed above in Alice’s cheating strategy on ε-concealing
QBC protocols.
Suppose that Alice prepares a bipartite system α ⊗ β
in the state
|Ω〉 = 1√
n− 1
n−1∑
i=1
|αi+〉α |φi+〉β . (6)
Here {|αi+〉α , i = 0, ..., n− 1} is an orthonormal basis of
the n-dimensional system α (the subscripts α and β will
be omitted thereafter). Obviously there is:
Result 1: for any i, if Alice projects α into |αi+〉 then
β will collapse into |φi+〉.
Now we will try to find the measurement on α which
can make β collapse to a state close to |φi−〉. Defining
|φn−〉 ≡ 1√
n
(
|0〉+
∑n−1
i=1
|i〉
)
, (7)
|α˜n−〉 ≡ 1√
n− 1
n−1∑
i=1
|αi+〉 , (8)
and
|α˜i−〉 ≡ 1√
1− 4/n2

2− n
n
|αi+〉+ 2
n
n−1∑
i′=1,i′ 6=i
|αi′+〉


(9)
for i = 1, ..., n− 1, then Eq. (6) equals to
|Ω〉 = 1√
n− 1
n−1∑
i=1
√
1− 4/n2 |α˜i−〉 |φi−〉
+
√
2
n
|α˜n−〉 |φn−〉 . (10)
For a given i ∈ {1, ..., n− 1}, if Alice can project sys-
tem α to |α˜i−〉, then Eq. (10) shows that system β will
collapse to
∣∣∣φ˜i−〉 ≡ c′
[
|φi−〉+
∑n−1
i′=1,i′ 6=i 〈α˜i− |α˜i′−〉 |φi′−〉√
n− 1/
√
1− 4/n2
+
√
2
n
〈α˜i− |α˜n−〉 |φn−〉
]
= c′
[√
1− 4/n2√
n− 1
(
|φi−〉 −
4
∑n−1
i′=1,i′ 6=i |φi′−〉
n2 − 4
)
+
√
2/n
√
n− 2√
n− 1√n+ 2 |φn−〉
]
, (11)
where
c′ =
√
n(n− 1)(n+ 2)
(n2 + 2)
. (12)
Thus we obtain:
Result 2: for any i, if Alice can project α into |α˜i−〉
defined in Eq. (9), then β will collapse into
∣∣∣φ˜i−〉 in Eq.
(11).
Multiplying 〈φi−| by Eq. (11), we have
〈φi−
∣∣∣φ˜i−〉 =
√
1− 2n+ 2
n2 + 2
, (13)
i.e.,
∣∣∣φ˜i−〉 is indeed very close to |φi−〉.
Now let us study the relationship between the states
in Results 1 and 2. From Eq. (9) we find
| 〈αi+ |α˜i−〉 |2 = 1− 4
n+ 2
, (14)
i.e., |αi+〉 and |α˜i−〉 are very close to each other when n
is high. In contrast, multiplying 〈φi+| by the right-hand
side of Eq. (11), we have
〈φi+
∣∣∣φ˜i−〉 = 0 (15)
for any n, i.e., |φi+〉 and
∣∣∣φ˜i−〉 are always strictly orthog-
onal to each other. Therefore, combining Results 1 and
2, we obtain the conclusion mentioned at the beginning
of this subsection, that for the bipartite state |Ω〉 in Eq.
(6), a subtle difference in the measurement results on α
can steer β into completely orthogonal states.
Note that when n is finite, for any i 6= i′, Eq. (9) shows
that 〈α˜i′− |α˜i−〉 6= 0, so that {|α˜i−〉 , i = 0, ..., n − 1}
cannot be used as an orthogonal measurement basis.
Thus it generally takes a positive-operator valued mea-
sure (POVM) to project α to an element of {|α˜i−〉}. But
with the fact that |αi+〉 and |α˜i−〉 are very close to each
other, it is clear that the measurement/POVM M+ and
M− for projecting α to an element of {|αi+〉} or {|α˜i−〉},
respectively, also become arbitrarily close to each other
as n increases. This is one of the key feature that leads
to our QBC protocol.
IV. OUR PROTOCOL
Since proving that secure QBC exists even only in the-
ory already has great significance (as indicated by the
Clifton-Bub-Halvorson (CBH) theorem that we will ad-
dressed in the Discussion section), here for simplicity, we
only consider the ideal case without practical imperfec-
tions, such as transmission errors, detection loss or dark
counts, etc. Under this setting, we propose the following
protocol.
Our QBC protocol:
The commit phase:
(i) Alice decides on the value of b that she wants to
commit. Then for j = 1 to s:
She randomly picks ij ∈ {1, 2, ..., nB} where nB →
∞, and sends Bob a quantum register Ψj, which is an
4infinite-dimensional system prepared in the state ψbij =
(|0〉+ (−1)b |ij〉)/
√
2.
Note that in each round, ij is independently chosen,
while b remains the same for all j.
(ii) Bob stores these s quantum registers unmeasured.
The unveil phase:
(iii) Alice announces the values of b and all ij ( j =
1, ..., s).
(iv) Bob tries to project each Ψj into the state ψ
b
ij
=
(|0〉+(−1)b |ij〉)/
√
2. If the projections are successful for
all registers, Bob accepts Alice’s commitment. Else if any
of the projections fails, Bob concludes that Alice cheated.
In brief, the protocol can be secure against Alice’s
cheating, as long as the quantum uncertainty principle
puts an upper bound on the precision of her measurement
devices, so that she cannot discriminate quantum states
with very little difference, which was required for imple-
menting the attack based on the HJW theorem against
the specific states {ψ0i } and {ψ1i } in Eqs. (1) and (2).
Also, the protocol is secure against dishonest Bob, be-
cause the density matrices corresponding to {ψ0i } and
{ψ1i } become arbitrarily close to each other when the di-
mension of the quantum system is sufficiently high. Now
let us give the security proof in details.
V. SECURITY AGAINST DISHONEST ALICE
It is trivial to show that in the commit phase of
our QBC protocol, if Alice sends Bob each register Ψj
honestly in a pure state ψbij = (|0〉 + (−1)b |ij〉)/
√
2
non-entangled with any other system, then she can-
not unveil the committed bit as b¯. This is because
|(1/√2)(〈0|+ (−1)b¯ 〈i′j∣∣)(|0〉 + (−1)b |ij〉)/√2|2 = δii′/4,
so that no matter how Alice chooses the value of i′j of each
j, the total probability for her to announce the states of
all the s registers as ψb¯i′j
instead of the actual ψbij without
being caught is bounded by (1/4)s, which is arbitrarily
close to 0 for a sufficiently high s value.
Now consider Alice’s general attack using entangled
states. For each register Ψj sent to Bob, the state of
Alice’s and Bob’s combined system α⊗ β can always be
written as
|Ωj〉 =
nA−1∑
ij=1
λij
∣∣αij+〉α ∣∣βij+〉β , (16)
where λij denotes the superposition coefficient. We must
emphasize that this form covers all possible states that
dishonest Alice may use. For example, even if she entan-
gles different registers Ψ1, Ψ2, ..., Ψj , ... together, we
can still single out Ψj as Bob’s system β in this equa-
tion, while treating all other Ψj′ (j
′ 6= j) as a part of
Alice’s system α. We also assume that she has full con-
trol over system α (although in fact she could not do so if
α includes other Ψj′), so that the security analysis below
covers the upper bound of Alice’s cheating probability.
In this case, if {
∣∣βij+〉β , ij = 1, ..., nA−1} contains any
element not belonging to
{
ψ0i = |φi+〉 , i = 1, ..., n− 1
}
defined in Eq. (1), and/or {∣∣αij+〉α , ij = 1, ..., nA − 1}
is not an orthogonal basis of α, then Alice cannot always
unveil the state of Ψj as ψ
0
i with the correct i value. Sup-
pose that the error rate is η, then for all the s registers,
her probability of unveiling b = 0 successfully is at the
order of magnitude of (1−η)s, which is trivial for high s.
Therefore, to ensure that she can unveiling b = 0 without
being caught, {
∣∣αij+〉α} has to be chosen as an orthogo-
nal basis of α, and {
∣∣βij+〉β} must be nA−1 elements se-
lected from {|φi+〉 , i = 1, ..., n− 1}. Without loss of gen-
erality, here we suppose that she chooses the first nA− 1
ones in order, i.e., {
∣∣βij+〉β = ∣∣φij+〉 , ij = 1, ..., nA − 1},
and each
∣∣φij+〉 is chosen with the equal probability.
Omitting the subscript j, we have
|Ω〉 = 1√
nA − 1
nA−1∑
i=1
|αi+〉α |φi+〉β . (17)
This equation is much the same as Eq. (6), except that
n is replaced by nA. Thus the analysis in the previous
subsection still applies. That is, although this |Ω〉 can en-
sure Alice to unveil b = 0 with probability 100%, it can-
not be unveiled as b = 1 without error. This is because
Eq. (10) shows that system β has a probability 2/nA
to be projected into |φnA−〉 = (|0〉 +
∑nA−1
i=1 |i〉)/
√
nA,
which is not a legitimate state for committing b = 1,
and it is also orthogonal to all legitimate states |φi−〉
(i = 1, ..., nA− 1). Then Alice’s announcing b = 1 stands
at least the probability 2/nA to be caught cheating for
each register, and the total probability for her to pass
Bob’s check on all the s registers is not greater than
p ≡ (1− 2/nA)s, (18)
which drops exponentially to 0 as s increases.
Also, Eq. (18) is merely a loose upper bound because
as we mentioned, {|α˜i−〉} in Eq. (10) is not an orthog-
onal basis for any finite n. Meanwhile, Eq. (13) shows
that
∣∣∣φ˜i−〉 does not equal to |φi−〉 exactly when n is fi-
nite. Therefore, it is impossible for Alice to discriminate
unambiguously which |φi−〉 (i = 1, ..., n) is the one that
Bob’s system β will collapse to, so that Alice’s actual
probability for passing Bob’s check on all the s registers
will be even smaller than Eq. (18).
More importantly, due to the existence of quantum un-
certainty principle, any measurement device cannot be
adjusted with unlimited precision, so that it cannot have
unlimited power on discriminating quantum states that
are very close to each other. If Alice chooses an extremely
high nA value, |αi+〉 and |α˜i−〉 can become so close (as
shown by Eq. (14)), that no physical device in the world
can help Alice distinguish them apart. Consequently,
whether β collapses to |φi+〉 or |φi−〉 becomes completely
5out of her control. That is, for any physical implemen-
tation of our protocol, the uncertainty principle puts a
limit on the maximum of the nA value that Alice can
choose (denoted as nAmax), such that she can discrimi-
nate |αi+〉 and |α˜i−〉 and thus steer Bob’s system β only
if she chooses nA ≤ nAmax. But she cannot do so any-
more if she chooses nA > nAmax. As a result, basing
on the closest |αi+〉 and |α˜i−〉 that can be discriminated
by the measurement devices actually used, we can de-
termine nAmax beforehand according to Eq. (14) (the
exact value will depend on the specific implementation
scheme though, so we cannot have a general estimation
here). Then with Eq. (18), we know that for any ex-
pected value pAmax, by choosing
s ≥ ln pAmax
ln(1− 2/nAmax) , (19)
it is sufficient to guarantee that the probability of Alice’s
successful cheating is bounded by p ≤ pAmax.
VI. SECURITY AGAINST DISHONEST BOB
As mentioned above, it was proven in Ref. [45] that
the density matrices ρ+, ρ− for {ψ0i }, {ψ1i } defined in
Eqs. (1) and (2), respectively, satisfy Eq. (5). Also,
the nB value in our protocol is irrelevant with dishonest
Alice’s nA and can be chosen to be much higher than s.
Therefore, from Bob’s point of view the range of Alice’s
selected ij for each ψ
b
ij
is always {1, ..., nB} with nB →∞
so that ρ+ and ρ− are arbitrarily close to each other.
The commit phase of our above protocol is simply to
send such states s times. Thus the density matrices of
the states sent to Bob for committing b = 0 and b = 1,
respectively, are ρβ0 = ρ
⊗s
+ and ρ
β
1 = ρ
⊗s
− . Obviously,
the concealing condition Eq. (4) is satisfied. Therefore,
the states are completely indistinguishable to Bob before
the unveil phase, so that the protocol is perfectly secure
against his cheating.
VII. A TECHNICAL REMARK ON TAKING
THE n → ∞ LIMIT
Some might wonder whether it is legitimate to take
the n → ∞ limit in Eq. (5) and the related equa-
tions in Ref. [45], because we are studying the two
sets of evenly distributed states defined in Eqs. (1) and
(2), where each state occurs with the equal probability
1/(n − 1). When n → ∞ this probability becomes 0
which does not seem to make sense. But we should al-
ways keep in mind that the actual question related with
our QBC protocol is: when Alice randomly selects a state
from {|φi+〉 , i = 1, ..., n− 1} or {|φi−〉 , i = 1, ..., n− 1},
can Bob distinguish which set it is from? Surely Alice can
still make such a selection when n → ∞, and each state
can be picked with the same probability even though we
may not write this probability as 1/(n−1). Also, the fact
that the trace distance satisfies D(ρ+, ρ−) = 1/
√
n− 1
for any finite n clearly shows that distinguishing ρ+ and
ρ− becomes harder and harder as n increases. Thus it is
natural to conclude that it will be even harder to distin-
guish whether a state is picked from {|φi+〉} or {|φi−〉}
when n → ∞. Therefore the security of our protocol
against dishonest Bob stays valid no matter the above
density matrix description of the states is adopted or not.
VIII. DISCUSSION
Although we merely show the theoretical existence of
unconditionally secure QBC without studying its feasi-
bility in practice, the result is still very important. It
re-opens the venues for cryptographic tasks that once
closed by the no-go proofs based on the HJW theorem,
such as quantum coin flipping and two-party secure com-
putations [49].
But more importantly, it also contributes to the devel-
opment of fundamental theories. There is an interesting
result called the CBH theorem [50], which is an inspiring
attempt to raise some information-theoretic constraints
to the level of fundamental laws of Nature, from which
quantum theory can be deduced. These constraints were
suggested to be three “no-go’s”, which are (I) the im-
possibility of superluminal information transfer, (II) the
impossibility of perfectly broadcasting of an unknown
state, and (III) the impossibility of unconditionally se-
cure BC. But recently, Heunen and Kissinger [51] sug-
gested that the impossibility of BC is not caused by the
conceptual structure of quantum theory, but by the al-
gebraic model assumed in [50]. Logically, this may in-
dicates that the fundamental axioms of quantum the-
ory alone do not necessarily lead to impossibility of BC.
Thus our finding (that QBC can be secure in infinite-
dimensional systems) seems to be in good agreement
with this result. Therefore, we may need to seek for
another information-theoretic principle as the third con-
straint in the CBH theorem. Or we will have to add
“strictly infinite-dimensional systems do not exist” as an
additional axiom to keep the no-go proofs of QBC valid.
Manipulating infinite-dimensional systems may indeed
be hard in practice if we want to use physical systems
with an infinite number of energy levels, because it may
imply an infinitely high energy. But there could be tricks
to use other degree of freedoms to serve as a replacement.
We will study such practical implementations in succes-
sive works.
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